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WHEN GREAT MINDS DON’T THINK ALIKE

van Pieter van der Kolk

1. Whether rational peer disagreement is impossible completely depends on the kind of  disagree-
ment, on the definition of  peerhood, and on how rationality is further understood. 
2. Almost all peer disagreements can be construed as being subjective, such that neither of  the dis-
agreeing beliefs is incorrect, in particular the more interesting ones. (Chapter 3) 
3. It is possible that, given a total body of  evidence, there is more than one belief  state that is ra-
tional to adopt toward a given proposition. (Chapter 4)  
4. The permissive conception of  rationality is a viable alternative to the more traditional, non-
permissive conception. (Chapter 5) 
5. The conciliatory view has a rather limited scope of  applicability. 
6. A brief  but comprehensive meeting about how the different parties use their concepts would 
resolve the debate about peer disagreement entirely. 
7. If  you don’t agree with this proposition, that’s fine. 
8. In fact, if  you don’t agree with any of  these propositions, that’s fine.
